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This paper attempts to survey, and to put into perspective, recent literature that has analyzed
the nature of credit relations between developed and developing countries. This analysis has
made use of recent advances in the economics of information and strategic interaction.
Traditional concepts of solvency and liquidity are of little help in understanding problems of
sovereign debt. Creditors do not have the means to seize the assets of a borrower in default.
Hence the borrower's net worth is not relevant in determining the amount of a loan that can be
recovered. A borrower who is expected eventually to repay his debts should be able to borrow
to meet any current debt-service obligations. A problem that is essential to a theory of
international lending is that of enforcement. The difficulty is one of ensuring that the two sides
of a loan contract adhere to it, in particular that the borrower repays the lender and the lenders
can commit themselves to penalize the borrower if he does not.
1. Introduction
In the early 1980's, several LDC's with very large debts to foreign banks
did not meet the payments schedules to which they had originally agreed.
Various participants in, and observers of, these markets began to speak of a
crisis,one which they feared might shake the banking system of the
developed countries. So far there has been no dramatic event to resolve the
status of these loans. The absence of overt clues to what will happen to those
involved with these debts generates a widespread interest in a conceptual
framework useful in interpreting the current situation.
In this paper, we seek to articulate very general principles for looking at
the most essential problems posed by international lending, ones that will be
common to the relationships of most sovereign debtors and their creditors.
*Eaton and Stiglitz acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation. We would
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i rns set of concepts is a necessary, although admittedly not a sufficient, tool
kit for understanding current events and prescribing public policy.
Our concern, then, is with the pure theory of sovereign lending or country
risk. We discuss the roles of borrowers, of lenders and of the various public
authorities who mediate between the two groups, or regulate the lenders, or
insure deposits in the banks. We make use of the literature on LDC
indebtedness, which is related to recent advances in the general theory of
credit markets. This work, in turn, incorporates recent advances in the
general theory of the economics of information and the theory of games.
Loans are a particular contractual arrangement between suppliers of
capital and the users of capital. The borrower promises to pay the lender
certain amounts at certain times. A paramount concern in designing the
contract is that the borrower may not be able to or may not wish to make
payments under certain circumstances. The possibility that the lender will
not recover his money is reflected not only in a high interest rate, but in the
covenants of the loan contract. The purpose of these covenants is to protect
the lender by precluding the borrower from engaging in certain activities,
and ensuring that he engages in others. The loan contract also stipulates
conditions under which the lender can intervene, e.g., in the event of a
default on another loan.
Credit markets, like labor markets, are characterized by implicit as well as
explicit contracts. For example, it is frequently the case that a lender makes a
short-term loan for a long-term investment. There is an understanding that
the loan will be renewed, except under unusual circumstances. The advantage
of the short-term contract isthat the lender can insist on additional
restrictions on the borrower to renew the loan. To stipulate all of these
restrictions on a conditional basis beforehand, at the time of the original
loan, would have been virtually impossible. What prevents the lender from
taking unfair advantage of the borrower are, as usual, reputation and
competition from other lenders.
Consequently, the distinction between equity and debt, that the borrower
is required to repay the principal plus interest on the latter and not on the
former, becomes somewhat blurred. Though indeed the borrower is required
to service a debt, there is no way that, in general, the borrower can be forced
to do so under all contingencies. Debt and equity are both contingent claims,
although they clearly differ in the nature of the contingencies involved. What
factors are observable, and therefore can be used to condition contractual
obligations, is an important determinant of the relationship between debtors
and creditors.
1.1. Defining default
We have not, so far, said what we mean by default. In a two-period model
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resources to the lender that are less than the fixed amount that he is
committed to pay the lender, then there is a default.
In multi-period models, however, the concept is somewhat more elusive. A
default occurs whenever the lender formally declares that the borrower has
violated a certain condition of the loan.' A. loan may be declared in default
when a borrower refuses (or is unable) to pay another loan. The lender does
not have to declare a loan in default, however; the contract only provides
him the right to do so.
Thus, in most situations, a default is a result of a set of decisions, not the
mechanical realization of some outcome. The proximate cause is generally
the result of the borrower's decision not to make all or part of a loan
payment that is due. But that decision, in turn, is frequently the result of the
lender's decision not to extend further credit.
When the relationship between debtor and creditor can, in principle, last
beyond the period in question, a violation of the repayment schedule, with or
without a default, is neither necessary nor sufficient for the lender to realize
less than the (present-discounted) value of the loan. A failure to make current
payments does not necessarily imply that future payments will not be made,
and conversely. This is one reason why observers of, and participants in, the
market cannot expect any very overt sign of the status of these loans.
There is therefore an important difference between two-period and finite
horizon, but multi-period, models. Furthermore, as we shall show, finite-
horizon and infinite-horizonnodels can have qualitatively quite different
properties when lenders can only ensure repayment through exclusion from
future borrowing.
Much of the recent literature has failed to recognize these aspects of
default. Thus, some writers attempt to relate default to insolvency, which
arises in the case of unsecured loans when the borrower's debt exceeds his
net worth (presumably inclusive of the debt). This is neither necessary nor
sufficient for the declaration of a default. The declaration of a default usually
has a large cost associated with it; an ongoing firm is almost always worth
more than the value of itsassets sold in a bankruptcy sale.2 And in
1We only use default in this restricted sense.
2Consider a firm for which it has suddenly become apparent that there is a large probability
that output will be zero. The expected present discounted value of its future income stream is
less than the value of its outstanding obligations. The firm is (by standard definitions) insolvent.
But a rational lender would not declare the firm in default if there were no moral hazard
problem. For doing so would simply waste away some of the value which the lender might
otherwise be able to appropriate. Consider, by contrast, a similar firm for which a new
investment opportunity suddenly becomes available. The new investment is very risky. The
expected present discounted value of the firm is very positive. If the firm undertakes the project,
however, the expected return of the bank will be substantially decreased. The bank only obtains
a return when the firm does not go bankrupt; it does not share in the bonanza which accrues if
the risky investment project is successful. The bank would like to stop the project, but its loan
contract does not have any provision enabling it to do so. If, however, there is a provision in the
loan contract which enables it to declare the loan in default, it would be in the interests of the
lender to do so, even though the firm is not insolvent.394 J. Eaton et al., The pure theory of country risk
international banking, declarations of default may trigger certain actions of
bank regulators that are costly to lenders, in the first instance, and possibly
to debtors as a consequence. What is at stake is more than the distribution
of claims between debtors and creditors. More importantly, in a formal
sense, insolvency is not really an issue in lending to foreign governments. The
debt of a country in almost all instances is less than the value of the assets
owned by nationals and the government of the country. There may be limits
on the extent to which governments can appropriate the assets, but these
limits themselves are, in general, not hard and fast constraints, but involve
trade-offs.3
While some writers have linked default to insolvency, others have linked it
to illiquidity. A borrower with a positive net worth who cannot convert the
required portion of his net worth into a means of payment is said to be
illiquid. The question is: why would no supplier of capital be willing to
supply credit if it were unambiguously clear what the net worth of the asset
were? Frequently, it is the withdrawal of credit that leads to the borrower's
illiquidity; but it is precisely this withdrawal of credit that the theory should
explain.
1.2. Domestic versus international lending
The ambiguity in the notion of default is relevant to both domestic and
international lending. But there are also very important differences between
the two, with consequences for the applicability of various concepts. We
review briefly three problems traditionally addressed in theories of credit
markets: Enforcement, moral hazard and adverse selection.
One problem in all lending is enforcement, the difficulty in ensuring that
both sides of a contract adhere to its terms. Here, the particular concern is
the difficulty of ensuring that the borrower pays the lender. The major
difference between domestic and international debt is that the former are
legalobligations,enforceableincourts.Anotherdifferenceisthat,
domestically, debtors who cannot meet their obligations have the option of
filing for bankruptcy. Repayment of international debt, however, is largely
voluntary; the penalties to be imposed on a country that does not honor a
contract are, at best, indirect. On the other hand, there is no systematic
procedure, corresponding to bankruptcy, by which a country that has
undertaken an excessive amount of debt can discharge its obligations and
proceed on its way.
For similar reasons, collateral, which can be important domestically, plays
littlerole in international lending.4 If the collateralisretained in the
3We emphasize our dissatisfaction with models that simply take critical parameters of the
economy as exogenous and, by so doing, create a problem.
4Note that the losses to the borrower often exceed the gains to the lender. This suggests that,
at least in some circumstances, the incentive effects of collateral are more important than its
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borrowing country, there is no mechanism by which the creditor can seize it.
If the collateral is moved outside the country, where the creditor can seize it,
the borrower will usually lose fully the use of it, so that the value of the loan
is reduced by the value of the collateral.5 A fully and effectively collateralized
loan would then be of no value to the borrower. As we shall see, the inability
to provide collateral may significantly exacerbate the problems facing credit
market participants.
When making loans to borrowers within the developed countries, lenders
need to pay relatively little attention to enforcement problems, but instead
must worry about problems of moral hazard. These arise because itis
difficult for the lender to monitor actions of the borrower to ensure that they
do not affect adversely the prospects for debt service. For instance, a firm
may have an investment opportunity with low expected return, but with the
possibility of a high return under some circumstances. In the good states, the
firm pays its creditors and reaps large net benefits; otherwise, the firm goes
bankrupt, and the creditor loses. Such a project may be quite attractive to
the firm, although quite undesirable from the creditor's viewpoint.
In international loans, such problems are much less prominent in the
relationship between country borrowers and their creditors. As we have
argued, the resources of the debtor are likely to be adequate to repay the
loans regardless. In a sense, it is the very importance of the enforcement
problem that, as we shall explain, keeps creditors from ever lending so much
that moral hazard problems involving choice among risky investments
become central. On the other hand, moral hazard problems may arise if (1)
borrowers can affect their susceptibility to penalties that enforce payment, or
(2) they can affect the likelihood that creditors will impose penalties (if
creditors cannot precommit fully), or (3) the total amount that they have
borrowed cannot be observed by individual lenders. In each of these
situations, borrowers' actions affect the probability of payment.
Moral hazard issues also arise in the relationship between banks and the
governmental insurers of bank deposits. This insurance obviates the need for
depositors to monitor adequately bank portfolios. There is a consequent
incentive for banks to lend in a risky fashion, hoping for big profits but able
to transfer large losses to their insurers. The traditional role for bank
regulators is to prevent these actions by rules on portfolio composition, but
these have been loosely designed, and have not prevented the lending of
multiples of bank capital to LDC's.
A third set of problems facing lenders are ones of adverse selection. Here
the difficulty is one of ascertaining the characteristics of a borrower, both
transitory and permanent, relevant to designing a repayment schedule and
judging whether a borrower will adhere to it. Without this ability, the lender
5There may, of course, be some exceptions such as the opportunity to seize airplanes owned
by a national airline in default that tries to use them in international service.396 J.Eaton et al., The pure theory of country risk
is vulnerable to attracting only those borrowers who know thattheir
repayment prospects are poor or who claim that they cannot pay when they
can. In many cases, however, outside lenders are as fully informed as
domestic politicians about the country's economic situation, and so adverse
selection may be less important internationally than domestically.
In our view, then, the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection
deserve attention, but really central to our understanding of credit relations
between developed and developing countries is identifying the incentives for
borrowers to repay, and for suppliers of capital to continue supplying capital.
As we shall show, actions of the borrower (or lender) may affect these
incentives. To the extent that borrowers can take actions that increase the
likelihood that they will repay their loans, they will be better off. By doing
so, they can increase the willingness of lenders to lend. Similarly, to the
extent that lenders take actions that increase the likelihood that they will
continue to renew the loans, borrowers may be more willing to borrow and
repay.
2. The willingness-tp-pay of borrowers
In the introduction, we sketched our basic view that, in most situations,
what happens to a loan is a result of a series of decisions, not the mechanical
realization of some outcome. Thus, the analysis of international credit
markets must focus on how borrowers and lenders make their decisions.
Surprisingly,a few simple notions can helptodelimitthe possible
relationships between debtors and creditors. For instance, the fact that loans
are voluntary rules out situations in which all future net transfers as of any
date are always from the lender to the borrower. Later on, we show that in
an important class of models, also net transfers cannot always be from the
borrower to the lender.
In this section, we focus on the behavior of borrowers, and in the next
section, we turn to the lenders. In a fundamental sense, the dichotomy is
artificial: A borrower's willingness to pay depends critically on his beliefs
about (1) the lender's resolve to penalize a recalcitrant borrower, and (2) the
lender's willingness to lend in the future. For now, we assume that the
potential penalties we discuss will always be imposed.
2.1. The general structure of models with penalties
We begin with an extremely simple two-period model. A loan of amount L
is made in the first period with an obligation to repay r(L) in the second
period. The model ends after the second period, so that there are no further
considerations that affect the participants.
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expressed in the same units as r(L). The borrower's welfare is a function
U[L, xl which increases with the amount borrowed, L, and decreases in the




The borrower who defaults receives total utility of
Ud=U[L,P] (2)
in the second period. If he does service the debt as agreed, his utility is
=U[L, r(L)]. (3)
The borrower chooses to pay if
UPUd. (4)
This comparison of alternativesisat the heart of a willingness-to-pay
approach.
Undertheassumptionsthatlendersarecompetitive and facean
opportunity cost of funds of i, the repayment lenders require is
r(L)=(1 + i)L. (5)
Substituting (1), (2), (3), and (5) into (4) implies that repayment occurs for
LP/(1+i). (6)
As long as lenders understand the borrower's situation some central
conclusions follow:
Borrowers may be credit constrained. If the borrower wishes to borrow a
little more than P/(1 +1) at rate i, he cannot On the other hand, the
borrower need not wish to borrow as much as he can.
There is never any inconsistency between a loan contract that says the
loan must be repaid with interest at rate i and what happens.
Penalties are never imposed.
If the borrower wants to borrow more, he benefits from an increase in
the penalty F.
If there is no penalty, one observes no lending rather than a rash of loan-398 J. Eaton et al., The pure theory of country risk
xr(L)=(1 +i)L, (5a)
contract violations. At itssimplest, willingness-to-pay is a theory of
rationing, not one of lender losses.
We use the simple model and its conclusions as a mechanism to organize
other formulations of the willingness-to-pay approach.
For instance, one modification that undermines the fourth conclusion on
the welfare effects of enhanced penalties, while maintaining the others, can
occur if the borrower is large, or if we consider simultaneous increases in the
penalties applied to a large number of borrowers. An increase in P may then
raise the world interest rate, to the borrowers' detriment. In the extreme, if
funds available for this kind of lending are fixed, an increase in P raises i
without raising L.
2.2. Models with uncertainty
Next, we begin to introduce uncertainty into the model, otherwise
returning to all the assumptions of eqs. (1)(5). For simplicity, assume that
the penalty depends on the state of nature, s,
P=P(s). (la)
Utility of the borrower if he defaults is
Ud= U[L,P,s], (2a)
and if he does not
U,=U[L, r(L), s], (3a)
where the argument s indicates that utility may depend on s in other ways
than through P. Note, however, that r(L), the amount of payment, does not
depend on s.
The debtor pays off his obligations in all states s in S for which
UPUd (4a)
and otherwise not, for s in S'. The borrower's expected utility is
f U0f(s) ds + f Udf(s) ds,
S 5'
where f(s) is the probability of state s. If lenders are competitive, risk-neutral
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where the probability of repayment is
= Jf(s) ds. (7)
The existence of uncertainty means that payment may not be made, and
the penalty may be imposed. An increase in the penalty need not increase a
borrower's expected utility. While it will normally increase the amount lent,
to the borrower's benefit, in those states when the country does not pay it
may be worse off.6
On the other hand, uncertainty need not imply x <1 if the repayment
schedule can also be made contingent on the state of nature. In this case, the
state contingent repayment, r(L, s), is chosen so that U,Ud for all s. This is
the approach taken by Grossman and Van Huyck (1985). The explicit legal
contract, however, conventionally specifies a single interest rate (or a single
spread above the market rate). Lenders do not have the scope to revise the
contractual interest rate upward, unless the borrower violates the contract.
The contractually specified payment must therefore be the maximum of
payments inallpossiblestates, r(L)=maxr(L,$). Any stateswith
r(L,$) <rcould then be called a situation of excusable default, in the
GrossmanVan Huyck terminology.Penaltiesare only imposed ifthe
country pays less than r(L,$), not less than r. This is one interpretation of
the current reschedulings. It presupposes that the state s can be observed by
both parties after the fact, and that disputes over what has happened do not
arise. The issue therefore remains of what situations can be used to condition
contracts.
A further set of complications arises if the acflons by the borrower can
affect the burden of the penalty. Actions that lenders perceive as increasing
the burden may improve the terms of loans. To do so such actions must be
observable by the lender and costly to reverse. Actions that are unobservable
but still raise the burden of the penalty give rise to a whole range of moral
hazard issues [Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and (1983)].
2.3. The nature of penalties
The simple models just discussed do not show how the penalty originates;
its size is exogenously given and does not depend on the characteristics of
debtors or creditors. In fact, however, we believe that the penalties available
tocreditorsareratherindirect,andthatidentifyingtheirultimate
implications for debtors is one of the basic issues in the pure theory of
6For instance, Sachs and Cohen (1985) point out that the opportunity not to pay may
substitute for insurance, allowing a risk-averse borrower to offset bad shocks elsewhere. See also
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country risk. Only by modeling the penalty realistically can one tell which
countries are most susceptible to them.
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981b)discuss some of thelegislationthat
potentially provides for penalties imposed by the U.S. government, while
Kaletsky (1985) provides a comprehensive review of the relevant legal,
institutional and political issues. What concerns us here are two types of
exclusions that creditors can potentially impose on debtors: (1) an embargo
of future borrowing, and (2) various forms of interference with the debtors'
international transactions and transfers.
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a) consider what it means to a borrower to be
excluded from future loans. Some very simple situations in which such a
penalty has no force can be mentioned. First, such a penalty only makes
sense in a model with an infinite horizon. If there were a last period, no
loans would be repaid in that period since there would be no future
exclusion to worry about. Lenders knowing this would never make a loan
coming due in this period. But, this in turn would render a threat of
exclusion meaningless from the viewpoint of the penultimate period, so no
loan coming due in this period would be possible. And so on, by backward
induction, the penalty would be unable to support any lending. Second, even
in an infinite-horizon world, such a penalty would be ineffective if the model
ever predicts that a point will be reached after which the flow will always be
from debtor to creditor, via arguments similar to those just made.
It is only when the future always holds some possibility of transfers in both
directions that this penalty becomes operative. It is for this reason that
Eaton and Gersovitz focus on a model in which the income of the borrower
alternates between low and high values, either in a deterministic or stochastic
way. If borrowers are risk averse, the demand for loans derives from a desire
for consumption smoothing. The cost of the denial of credit is that the
country must resort to other methods for consumption smoothing (e.g.,
building up stockpiles), or it must accept a greater fluctuation inits
consumption pattern.
If lenders are risk neutral and borrowers risk averse, the lenders can
smooth borrowers' consumption at no cost to themselves. In effect, the
penalty is the loss of consumers' surplus on being excluded from the market;
it is inframarginal from the borrower's viewpoint. The penalty (and hence the
supply of credit) is higher the greater the cost to the borrower of exclusion,
which in turn is higher: (1) the greater the borrower's elasticity of marginal
utility, (2) the more variable its income, (3) the lower the cost of smoothing
via the international capital market, i.e., the lower the world interest rate;
and (4) the more limited are domestically available options for smoothing
consumption. A country with limited risk aversion may still want to make
great useof thepossibilitiesfor consumption smoothing afforded by
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option may not be large, however, so that the current demand for the facility
is not necessarily related to the penalty occasioned by the loss.
Uncertainty, or at least income variation, seems crucial for the penalty of
exclusion to have force. By contrast, the argument is sometimes made
informally that countries that need funds for development are likely to suffer
if denied loans. It is true that they may benefit greatly from being able to
borrow, but this is not the same as saying that the penalty of exclusion can
assure the lender that he will be repaid. Borrowing for capital accumulation
or productive investment implies that a point will be reached beyond which
the debtor will begin making transfers to his creditor. Once the marginal
product of capital equals the interest rate, there will be no further gain to
moving capital to the debtor. At this point, the debtor will lose nothing by
being denied access to credit markets, and will refuse to service his debts.
And, by backward induction as before, it will never be possible to lend with
prospects of payment.
Owners of capital can entrust it to others who have the opportunity for
profitable investment, and obtain payment by threatening exclusion from
future access to capital, but in situations that do not seem relevant to
financial lenders. Allen (1983) discusses how landowners may be able to
ensure that they are paid even if those who use their land could, in principle,
abscond without paying their rents. In his model, the land must be left
behind, and those who do not pay landlords cannot get land to farm in the
future. As a result, they may have diminished income opportunities in the
future, in which case the penalty has deterrent value.
Eaton and Gersovitz (1983) discuss a model of direct foreign investment.
In this case, capital depreciates and cannot be replaced without the help of
foreign investors.If they are expropriated, foreign investorsrefuse to
cooperate, and exclude the country from the market for physical capital in
the future. Here again, financial lenders do not seem able to impose such a
penalty package.
International lending appears to play an important role in financing
international trade. Borrowing does not simply finance the current account
deficit, butisassociated with the level of international purchases. In
principle, a country could trade on the basis of barter, but to do so is likely
to be costly. Kraft (1984) reports that Mexican officials perceived the
disruption of trade as the primary cost of default. Iran, when faced with a
temporary credit embargo, found trade difficult, even though the country was
a net creditor.
When countries can anticipate problems in effecting transactions, however,
they can act to shield themselves. Waiting to impose penalties may diminish
their efficacy. Countries may accumulate foreign reserves to finance post-
default trade, rather than use income to pay debts. Trading partners that
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know what potential institutions will try to substitute for banks, thereby
undermining the sanctions available to banks.
Gersovitz (1983) develops a model in which the penalty associated with
default depends positively on the importance to a debtor of its opportunity
to trade. An implication isthat a borrower's commitment to increase
investment raises the credit ceiling if it increases the value of the option to
trade. In the factor endowment model this is not always the case. If the
investment is in import-competing industries, then the country may be better
able to withstand a credit embargo. If the investment is in export industries,
requiring at the same time large imports of certain key materials, then the
country may be in a much worse position to withstand a credit embargo.
In a series of papers Sachs (1984), Cooper and Sachs (1985), and Sachs and
Cohen (1985) assume that the penalty is proportional to income. This
assumption is useful in illustrating certain basic aspects of creditordebtor
relationships, as is the model of subsection 2.1, but the penalty is clearly not
a plausible one in the same way as an exclusion from future borrowing or
trade transactions. As a consequence, some of their conclusions seem
questionable, such as their emphasis on the benefits obtained by a credit-
constrained borrower who can precommit to investmentratherthan
consumption; see Gersovitz (1985).
3. The resolve of lenders
So far, we have assumed that lenders always penalize debtors who do not
adhere to loan agreements. But will lenders do so? There is no obvious way
that lenders can commit themselves at the time the loan is made to punish a
country that refuses to pay. Depending on the situation, it may be costly to
penalize recalcitrant debtors. Moreover, punishment may not affect the
prospect of a resumption of debt service. If it is not in the interest of lenders
to punish, then the threat of punishment will not be credible to borrowers.
An equilibrium with positive lending will be infeasible.
In some cases the penalties may be fairly automatic. For instance, if a
country that refuses to pay banks tries to transact with the help of these
same banks, it may find that its transactions balances are offset by the banks
against its outstanding obligations. The country will then have to seek
alternative means of effecting transactions, presumably at higher cost, to
avoid this threat. In fact, a promise by the banks not to seize the country's
balance may itself not be credible. This mechanism is part of the justification
behind the tradecost model in Gersovitz (1983).
There is more doubt, however, about the resolve of lenders to exclude
debtors from future loans. Below, we discuss two models. In one, lenders do
cut off credit from those who are in default (as part of a reputational
equilibrium), but in the other they do not, and the loan market ceases to
function.J. Eaton et al., The pure theory of country risk 403
3.1. Penalties in reputation-based models
Contracts that are unenforceable through the legal system may still be
enforced by some kind of reputational mechanism. The threat of losing one's
reputation (credit rating) is what induces so-called good behavior (repayment
of the loan). There are two classes of reputational models. In one there are
markets in which there are inherently good and bad borrowers. Lenders
make an inference concerning individuals according to their past behavior.
Thus it is the fear of being classified as a bad borrower that induces good
behavior. But even if there is only one type of borrower, reputational
mechanisms may be effective. To construct a reputational equilibrium one
must show that, if a borrower does not service a loan, it will not pay the
lender (or any other lender) to extend credit to him. Thus reputational
models entail the simultaneous analysis of borrower and lender behavior.
In Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a), lenders are competitive, and each occupies
a small share of the market, earning zero profit on any loan. It therefore
costs the lender nothing to refrain from future lending. Moreover, in their
model, the borrowers and lenders interact over a potentially infinite horizon.
[In a finite horizon, a loss of reputation means nothing in the last period,
and therefore cannot justify any last-period lending. By backward induction,
reputation is meaningless, as in the chain-store paradox discussed by Selten
(1978).]
If there is no finite upper bound on the number of times players expect to
play a game, however, and their identity is remembered by their opponents,
then the players' reputation as cooperative players can succeed in enforcing
some degree of cooperation. A player who fails to cooperate at any single
play will not find cooperative partners for subsequent plays. If players'
discount rates are zero then full cooperation isensured, while infinite
discount rates leads to no cooperation. With a finite but positive discount
rate, some cooperation emerges, and in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a) this is
embodied in the credit ceiling that sets the maximum loan that lenders will
extend to countries that have paid in the past.
For the threat of withdrawal of credit to be a credible sanction, it must
not only be in the interests of the current creditors to withdraw credit, but it
also must be in the interests of potential creditors not to extend credit. The
relatively small number of international banks may be able to sustain the
cooperative outcome (in which they all punish defaulters) within a non-
cooperative context. Since they deal with each other repeatedly, those who
failto cooperate will themselves be punished. Moreover, the country's
current bankers are likely to be more informed concerning the country than
other potential lenders. Hence, the refusal of the current lenders to continue
7Kreps and Wilson (1982) suggest how imperfect information of a particular kind can sustain
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extending credit may lead others to refuse as well; see Greenwald, Stiglitz
and Weiss (1984). Indeed, the current lender usually has more to gain from
the continuation of credit than do others, for it stands to recover earlier
loans as well.
Finally, seniority clauses in international loan contracts could be enforced
by earlier lenders against subsequent lenders in the courts of developed
countries, thereby dissuading other potential lenders. Such clauses are
attractive because they do not require a suit or enforcement of a judgement
against the sovereign debtor. Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) show that if there are
seniority provisions in outstanding loans, then if the current lender refused to
lend, others will as well.
Because individuals are finite lived, they may lack incentives to impose
penalties, so lending among individuals may not be sustainable. Infinitely-
lived institutions, such as banks, can emerge, however, that can credibly
threaten to punish debtors in order to maintain their reputation as lenders.
Maintaining the value of their equity investments in a bank provides the
incentive to the owners of the bank to punish default. The failure to do so
would cause the value of a bank's equity to fall to zero.
For this mechanism to work, the value of bank equity must exceed the
cost of imposing the penalty. If it is costly to punish, a bank must earn a
profit strictly in excess of zero. The interest rate on loans consequently
exceeds that on deposits. Even though in equilibrium the penalty is never
imposed, the cost of implementing the penalty causes the equilibrium
allocation todiffer from what would emerge if loan repayment were
automatic, see Eaton (1985).
3.2. Information and the lender's problem
Lenders need information to make sure that they can prevent the debtor
from getting into situations in which debt is not serviced. In subsection 2.2,
we discussed a model in which debtors did not pay in some states of nature,
but debtors and lenders had the same information about the likelihood of
these states of nature. Borrowers may, however, have more information than
lenders about their own attributes that determine their susceptibility to
penalties, and even about the total amount of debt they have undertaken
which, with the penalty, determines the set of states when the borrower does
not pay as he contracted.
Kletzer (1984) analyzes some of the problems that arise under these
circumstances in a model similar to that of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a). He
focuses on knowledge about the amount lent, a crucial determinant of
borrower behavior. [See also Arnott and Stiglitz(1982) forthe basic
structure of such moral hazard problems.]
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loan-interest-rate combination that maximizes borrower utility subject to the
zero-profit condition. The equilibrium isconsequently determined by a
tangency of a borrower's indifference curve tothe supply curve. The
borrower will be constrained in that, given the interest rate, he would prefer
to borrow more.
On the other hand, the total amount lent may be unobserved by lenders.
If an equilibrium with positive debt exists under these circumstances, it will
be characterized by both a higher debt and a higher interest rate than if debt
is observable. The borrower is better off when debt is observable, however;
the lower rate of interest more than compensates for the rationing of credit.
Kletzer interprets lending through syndicates and the importance of short-
term debt as institutional arrangements in international financial markets
that facilitate lenders' monitoring and control of the borrower's total debt.
As we noted in section 2, borrowers may be able to take actions that affect
penalties, and thereby undermine their willingness to pay. To the extent that
theseactions are observable, and lenders can deter them by credibly
threatening sanctions, no moral hazard problems arise. But when the action
is unobservable, moral hazard problems are a concern [Stiglitz and Weiss,
(1981, 1983)]. Furthermore, if different borrowers have different unobservable
susceptibilitiestopenalties,creditorswill have an incentiveto design
contracts that improve the quality of their borrowers, or that sort borrowers.
As a result market equilibria may be characterized by credit rationing and/or
a non-linear relationship between interest payments and loan size [see Jaffee
and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1983)]. For instance, in the
context of international loans, whether debtors are prepared to adopt an
IMF program or not may serve to distinguish between countries that do and
do not intend to service their debts.
3.3. The breakdown of lending
So far, we have looked at models in which lenders may manage to deal
with problems of asymmetric information and credibility, at least sufficiently
to justify some lending. Heliwig (1977) provides a model that stresses the
inability of lenders to cope with enforcement problems, and their consequent
inability to lend.
In this model, the breakdown of lending results from the lender's inability
to precommit himself to a ceiling on indebtedness. The borrower is an agent
with zero current income. At some unknown future date the borrower's
income is expected to jump to a permanently higher level. If by that time the
borrower has not defaulted then any debt up to some maximum is repaid. In
the meantime, the borrower finances his consumption from loans. The lender
extends a line of credit which the borrower draws down as he consumes. If
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more credit is forthcoming. If default occurs, the borrower's utility from that
moment onward isspecified exogenously as a decreasing function of
indebtedness.
A particular consumption profile corresponds to each amount of total
credit that the borrower believes available. The lender wants the borrower to
draw on credit slowly, minimizing the probability of default before income
rises. If the lender could precommit to providing a particular amount of
credit then a loan to the borrower can provide a non-negative expected yield.
The problem is that if the borrower exhausts the initial line of credit before
his income rises, the lender has an incentive to provide more. Cutting the
borrower off ensures default; extending credit maintains a hope of repayment.
Part of the return on additional funds committed to the borrower is the
possibility of salvaging some of what has already been lent. The lender will
consequently make loans that would not yield a profitable expected return
on their own. It pays him at that point to throw good money after bad.8
The borrower perceives that when he exhausts the initial loan the lender
will provide more. He consequently draws down the initial loan more
quickly. This raises the probability of his incurring the maximum amount of
debt that will be repaid before income rises, at which point credit is cut off.
By initially extending credit, then, the lender places himself in a situation
in which the commitment of additional funds may be profitable even though
the expected return on all funds committed isnegative. To avoid this
imbroglio he desists from lending in the first place. He suffers from his
inability to control the borrower's consumption once the loan has been
made, and from his inability to control his own future lending behavior.
While some features of Hellwig's model may seem special, the point raised is
more general, as shown by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
3.4. Panics by lenders
The previoussectionexplained why enforcement and commitment
problems may constrain lendingin some circumstances,even though
additional lending may be mutually beneficial in the absence of these
problems. We now examine situations in which banks that have been lending
suddenly cut off credit. There is some similarity between such credit runs and
the traditional problem of bank runs.
While bank runs have long been a source of concern, only recently have
researchers developed simple models to analyze them [see Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) and Nakamura (1985)]. Diamond and Dybvig analyze runs
using game theory. All lenders are better off if none withdraws his funds. But
8Note that the current lender's incentives for extending credit are thus greater than the
incentives of other potential lenders [recall our earlier discussion and StiglitzWeiss (1983)].J. Eaton et al., The pure theory of country risk 407
if some depositors run, the others are better off if they simultaneously
withdraw their funds, or, indeed, anticipate the others' action and withdraw
first. There exist perfect equilibria in which all try to withdraw and others in
which none do.
Nakamura observes that the expected rate of return on deposits isa
function of the number of depositors withdrawing their funds; while at the
same time, the number of depositors withdrawing their funds is a function of
the expected rate of return. There may be multiple solutions to this pair of
equations, in one of which many depositors withdraw funds (a run), and in
the other of which few do. The existence of multiple equilibria raises
questions about which equilibrium prevails, and why and how the economy
moves among them.
Depositors are, of course, the bank's creditors; the phenomenon of runs
can arise whenever a borrower has many creditors and there are short-term
liabilities. Each creditor wishes to protect himself; in doingso, he may
actually increase the likelihood that others will be unable to recoup what
they have lent. This is a potentially important externality.
The occurrence of runs depends critically on the form of the debt
instrument. For instance, in the DiamondDybvig model, the bank must
allow any customer to withdraw his entire deposit at the posted yieldon a
first-come-first-served basis. Other contract arrangements avoid this problem;
for instance, if there is a well-defined seniority structure, runs will notoccur.
Runs do not occur against mutual funds, since the asset value is continuously
redefined. To the extent that the runs problem is important, one needs to
explain why a contractual form that leads to runs is employed.
Sachs (1984) and Krugman (1985) present models similar to Diamond and
Dybvig with respect to syndicated bank loans to developing countries, only
with the borrowing country assuming the role of the banks and the lending
banks that of the individual depositors. In period one the borrower owes
debt to a large number of bank lenders, an amount that exceeds current
income.
The central problem in explaining credit runs is why it does notpay other
banks to step in when one lender withdraws credit. Sachs resolves this
difficulty by assuming that each bank faces a rising marginal cost of loans,
an assumption that can be justified by bank exposure regulations or by
managerial risk aversion. Because individual banks face an increasing
marginal cost of lending, it may not pay any single bank to extenda loan to
avoid a default in the first period. It is in the collective interest of all
creditors to extend further credit in concert, guaranteeing themselves the
necessary return. The reason for this in Sachs' model is that a failure to
renew any loan in the first period brings about a situation in which rio loan
is repaid in either period. More generally, this will be true if the return on
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contrasted with that of Kletzer (and moral hazard analysis, in general) where
the return on one loan decreases with the amount lent by others.
The assumption of an increasing marginal cost to each bank of lending
may be questioned. The senior debtor knows that if he refuses to renew
credit others will do so as well [see also Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)]. Even if
the cost of capital increases with exposure, once some amount has been
extended, a bank may be willing to commit further funds to prevent the loss
of the original commitment even if, standing alone, the yield would be
inadequate. Consequently, it is a bank with an initially large exposure that
will find the value of extending further credit the greatest.
The criticisms levied earlier at the DiamondDybvig model apply here as
well. In particular, to the extent that this is a serious problem, it should have
been anticipated. To the extent that it was anticipated, the problem could
have been forestalled, e.g., by each bank lending for two periods, and only on
the condition that other banks lent for a similar period. There is, moreover,
one important difference between bank behavior and the behavior of
depositors. Because banks are engaged in economic relations with each other
repeatedly over an extended period of time, there may exist a cooperative
equilibrium that sustains the efficient outcome (no-runs).
As Gersovitz (1985) has pointed out, there is a basic difference between a
situation in which the debtor would like to obtain a new net flow of funds
and one in which he merely wants to postpone debt service. It is the latter
situation that most debtors have confronted who have recently engaged in
reschedulings. They are making net payments to their creditors, but less than
would be required by the original loan contracts in the absence of new loans.
In this case, the debtor can deal with reluctant creditors by declaring a
unilateral, partial moratorium on debt service. If all creditors have the same
upward-sloping cost of funds, the debtor will minimize their losses by making
proportional (although partial) payments. By contrast, the upward-sloping
cost of funds and the associated externality means that it may not be
possible for the debtor first to pay all creditors and then to ask them for
further funds. Itisthisdifference between a pro-rated moratorium or
rescheduling and a refinancing after payment that the Sachs and Krugman
models explain. On this interpretation current problems are more ones of
form than substance, assuming, of course, that there is no fundamental
reason, such as willingness-to-pay, why debt service will not be resumed.
It would be quite another thing if debtors needed positive flows. For
instance, a debtor may have an investment project already underway that
will become valueless without a further infusion of funds to allow its
completion. In this case, the debtor could not unilaterally initiate a solution
and the prospects for success under the Sachs and Krugman assumptions
would be very much reduced. The problem would then be closer to that
originally postulated by Diamond and Dybvig who assume that two-period
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4. A re-examination of the solvency issue
Earlier, we remarked that it seems implausible that lending to developing
countries is constrained by their ability to pay, or solvency. Debt levels do
not seem so high, and, we argue, for a good reason: Long before a country's
ability-to-pay would become relevant, its willingness-to-pay constrains its
access to credit.
An earlier literature did analyze the sovereign debt problems from a
solvency viewpoint, however, and in this section we briefly re-examine this
literature using the framework we have just presented. Although primary
reliance on ability-to-pay models is dangerous, some important insights can
be gained from this approach. Indeed, as noted, some of the models of
lenders' resolve we reviewed use solvency concepts in determining when
payment occurs.
A useful way of understanding the problems that arise in evaluating the
ability of the borrower to repay a loan is to look at the basic balance of
trade identities. If D is total debt, AD repayment of debt, r the interest rate,
and B the trade balance then in any period
AD+rDB. (8)
If S is private savings,I domestic investment, T tax revenue and G
government spending, another identity is that
AD(SI)+(T--G). (9)
Thus debt service is related both to the trade surplus and to private and
government savings.If domestic product Y isindependent ofT, an
unconstrained government could in theory set T = Y, and G = I= 0, in which
case S = - rD and AD + rD = Y. Though eqs. (8) and (9) are nothing more than
identities, they provide a framework for understanding possible sources of
problems in a country's meeting its foreign debt obligations.
An early paper by Domar (1950) made the point that a lender country
could perpetually run a current account surplus oniy if the growth rate of
loanable funds permanently exceeded the interest rate. Avramovic et al.
(1964) applies an analysis somewhat like Domar's to a borrowing country.
There are fixed savings, tax and import parameters. In this contexta
borrowereventuallycannotrepayhisdebtunlesshisgrowthrate
permanently exceeds the interest rate.
Such models suffer from two problems. First, the variables that they take
as exogenous, such as the growth rate, are endogenous. Second, if they were
exogenous, a variety of conundrums would arise. If the borrower's growth
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of matching loanable funds to the implied loan demand. On the other hand,
how is repayment to occur if and when the growth falls below the interest
rate?
Since sovereignloansare owed by the governmentsof countries,
repayment is not constrained by the net worth of the country, but by that
component of net worth thatthe government can (oriswillingto)
appropriate. For a government that can impose lump-sum taxation at no
administrative cost, national wealth and maximal government revenue do
coincide. Taxes typically impose excess burdens and are costly to raise,
however, so that the maximal amount that the government can extract from
an economy falls short of the net worth of the economy. Nonetheless, it
seemsimplausiblethatgovernmentsareanywhere near makingthe
maximum feasible debt service.
Kharas (1984) and Sachs (1984) model solvency in terms of a constraint on
government revenue. The firstisa variant of the Domar (1944) and
Avramovic et al. (1964) models with an exogenous, fixed proportional tax
rate, as well as an exogenous saving rate. Sachs (1984) considers a two-
period optimizing framework in which a government faces a revenue
constraint only in the repayment period. He emphasizes that such a
government should borrow less than the amount that equates the world
interest rate to the domestic marginal product of capital. The reason is that
the binding resource constraint implies a higher marginal cost of government
revenue in the repayment period than in the borrowing period.
The argument that a binding government budget constraint reduces
optimal borrowing does not, however, generalize much beyond this example.
If the government wer; constrained in total resources from domestic sources
in the initial, rather than the repayment, period then the marginal cost of
funds in that period would exceed that in the repayment period. Efficiency
would demand borrowing more than the amount that, if invested, would
equate the domestic marginal product of capital to the world interest rate.
The argument also assumes that the revenue from investments financed by
the loan does not accrue to the government, but must be taxed from the
private sector. Otherwise the standard condition for optimality would apply.
More generally, there is not a rigid constraint on raising taxes in any
period. Efficient borrowing-cum-tax policy will take into account three
factors: (1) the marginal (social) cost of raising revenue increases with the
amount raised in any period, (2) additional investment at one date may affect
the marginal cost of raising funds at a later date, and (3) borrowing costs
may increase as a country borrows more within any period. Plausible models
may be constructed that imply a country should borrow more than the
amount that would, if invested, equate the domestic marginal product of
capital to the world interest rate.
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for repayment to lenders abroad isthe difficulty in transferring national
assets to foreigners. Simonsen (1985) provides an extreme version of this view
which postulates an autonomous trade balance. A country's net worth, from
a lender's perspective,, is consequently the discounted present value of its
trade account. For a solvent borrower this amount exceeds the value of debt.
The value of resources within the country is irrelevant since there is no way
to transfer them to foreigners except through the trade account. A less
extreme version of this view models the trade account as a function of a set
of variables that are partially responsive to policy. Repayment then requires
that the government pursue policies that yield the necessary trade account
surplus. This view precludes the possibility of repayment by a direct sale of
domestic assets to foreigners without their contemporaneous export.
One argument why the trade balance constrains a debtor's ability to repay
is the traditional transfer problem, an issue raised by Diaz-Alejandro (1984).
Repayment could worsen the terms of trade of a debtor, consequently
reducing his capacity to service debt. But the transfer of purchasing power
(as represented by the repayment of loans) from a small debtor to a larger
creditor probably will not have a significantly adverse effect on the terms of
trade.9
These solvency models emphasize how borrowers can come up against a
net-worth constraint and become unable to pay. A more complete picture is
given by other models that incorporate the behavior of lenders, who only
lend if there is a reasonable probability that this situation can be prevented.
In these models credit crises never arise since no bank lends more than the
borrower can repay. If repayment capacity is stochastic the bank will in
general lend so much that in some contingencies repayment is impossible, at
least without rescheduling (recall section 2.2).
Jaffee and Modigliani (1969) present a model of a borrower with limited
resources next period to repay a loan. They make the point that if the
resources available to repay a loan are limited, then there is clearly an upper
bound on the amount that a lender will be willing to lend.
The models of solvency that we have discussed up to this point have
treated the value of the borrower's resources available for repayment as an
exogenous variable, and have assumed that borrowers and lenders share the
same subjective probability distribution about that value. In fact, borrowers
are more likelyto have better information about their worth in the
repayment period than lenders, and borrowers' actions affect what that
distribution will be. Consequently lenders face problems of adverse selection
and moral hazard.
The terms of the contract affect both the mix of applicants and the actions
undertaken by those who get loans. Thus, increasing the rate of interest may
91tis worth noting, however, that the initial extension of the loan must have been
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actually lower the bank's expected return, both because the best risks (from
the lender's perspective) decide not to apply and because the higher interest
charges induce borrowers to undertake greater risks. The consequence of this
is that banks may find it profitable to charge an interest rate below the
market clearing level. This results in credit rationing [see Keeton (1979) and
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)].
Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) also show how a bank involved repeatedly in
lending to a particular borrower can use the terms of subsequent loans to
modify the selection of borrowers or decisions of borrowers to its own
advantage. They assume that the bank credibly commit itself to the terms of
subsequent loans when the initial loan is extended. In particular they show
that a bank may exclude a borrower in default from subsequent loans to
discourage (ex ante) risky investments.'0 They also have analyzed the role of
collateral, showing that its absence exacerbates problems, although credit
rationing may still exist with collateral. Thus credit rationing may be more
important in country loans, where collateral is not feasible, than in domestic
loans.
The ModiglianiJaffeeandStiglitzWeisspapers show how credit
rationing can arise when the borrower's insolvency threatens a loan. An
implication of the Stiglitz and Weiss papers is that solvency itself cannot be
defined independently of the actions of borrowers and lenders. Even though,
ex post, the lender receives all the borrower's assets if a default occurs, the
borrower can affect the probability of being able to pay. Ex ante the lender's
return 'isaffected by the borrower'sactions. Even when the solvency
constraint is binding ex post, the borrower's willingness-to-pay is important
in this ex ante sense.
5. Operationalizing and testing the theories
Economists have investigated a fairly large number of theoretical notions
in their discussion of international lending. While many of the models
complement each other, we have remarked upon important conceptual
differences among them. In this section and the next we are motivated by a
set of very general questions about the empirical relevance of these models:
How can these theories help to interpret recent developments in international
lending? How can they be used to identify future topics of importance and to
make predictions? How can experience in the markets be used to distinguish
which theories are relevant? What are the priorities for further theoretical
research? In short, what are the connections between the theories, empirical
research and what is happening in these markets?
'°Their analysis thus provides part of the explanation of why lenders wish to cut bad
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Specific empirical questions facing the researcher range from knowing the
facts to understanding the actual behtvior of borrowers and lenders. Some
examples are: How much has been lent and what determines the amount
lenders wish to lend, borrowers wish to borrow, and the actual amount of
debt outstanding? What are the terms of the loans, and what determines
them? What types of ruptures occur between lenders and borrowers, anc
why? Do lenders maintain unity in confrontations with debtors, and under
what circumstances? What are the terms of the reschedulings? of IMF
agreements?
Some of these questions are informational, and knowledge of particular
facts can answer them. No econometric analysis is needed. Others involve
evidence on the motivations of borrowers and lenders, and involve inferences
about behavior. In principle, econometric analysis is appropriate; in practice,
there are limitations to the application of econometric methods. One obstacle
to econometric work arises because the informational questions are logically
prior to econometric analysis, and when they cannot be answered in a
satisfactorymanner,there may belittlepointtopressing on with
econometric analysis.
One basic problem confronting all econometric studies of sovereign debt is
that the unit of analysis is unavoidably the country. Consequently, it is very
difficult to identify exogenous variables that vary by the unit of analysis. The
interpretation of many results in the literature is clouded by the inclusion in
the estimated relationships of many endogenous variables as explanatory
variables. The terms of trade, however, is one important source of external
shocks that may be roughly exogenous for many developing countries, which
tend to be relatively small in world markets. Similarly, it may be possible to
introduce climatological variables to measure an important set of domestic
shocks when agriculture is an important source of income, exports and
government revenues.
Existing studies fall into two groups corresponding to an earlier and a
later stage in the relationship between borrowers and lenders. One group
focuses on an environment of voluntary lending, and seeks to identify the
determinants of the quantity of debt, and the terms at which it is contracted.
The second type of study focuses on when debt problems arise. So far there
are no studies that address the prospects for a resumption of voluntary
lending to countries that have experienced problems.
Estimating the determinants of debt outstanding is quite difficult. Even in
the absence of problem cases, it is necessary to allow for the possibility that
observed debt is the minimum of the credit ceiling and desired debt. This
implies two regimes. An appropriate econometric technique produces not
only coefficient values but also a probabilistic separation of the sample into
the two regimes. The existence of problem debtors whose debt exceeds the
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empirical work if both cases of voluntary and involuntary lending are to be
treated In a unified analysis.
At present, only the two-regime model has been estimated [Eaton and
Gersovitz (1980, 1981a)]. In these studies the observations on individual
countries were from 1970 and 1974, so that there was no need to account for
problem debtors. By the same token, however, these results apply to only a
very early period in the evolution of lending to developing countries. Bank
lending was much less important before 1973-1974. The results of these
studies indicate that two regimes rather than only one are justified; the
credit-constrained regime was relatively more prevalent.1' In 1974 relatively
more countries were credit-constrained. Some of the oil exporters that were
included in the sample for both years moved against this trend, however, as
one would expect. The analysis of Eaton and Gersovitz (1980), which
considers determinants of foreign reserve holdings as well as international
indebtedness, suggests that debt was a substitute for reserves.
In the analysis of debt levels and debt problems, an important distinction
is between the long-run characteristics of countries (for instance, the standard
deviation of the terms of trade about trend) and transitory shocks that they
may experience (the actual deviation of the terms of trade from trend in any
one year). For instance, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a) present a model in
which an increase in the permanent variability of a debtor's income can
increase the debt ceiling it faces, although a failure to repay, if it occurs at
all, will occur in a period of relatively low income. Existing studies use some
constructed measures for long-run country characteristics such asthe
variability of exports. They do not, however, incorporate variables capturing
transitoryfactorsintotheestimation. Under reasonabledistributional
assumptions, the omission of these variables (and their implicit inclusion in
the error term) need not bias the estimated coefficients. Of course, their
omission does mean that these models do not reflect the role of shocks in
determining indebtedness.
Gersovitz (1985) presents graphical evidence that debt has tended to
increase most markedly when the terms of trade would seem to have been
temporarily high. Thus, debt does not seem to have helped countries to
smooth their absorption, despite the theoretical presumption that debtors
would want this pattern, and that creditors should want to accommodate
them to the extent that debt is below the borrower's credit ceiling. It may be
that when shock variables are included in the formal econometric work, this
casual impression will be reversed. If it is not, however, it may be possible to
"Identification of the regimes is difficult because theory suggests that almost all variables
influencing the desired debt should also influence the credit ceiling, and conversely. Eaton and
Gersovitz use restrictions on the signs of coefficients as well as the fact that when the credit
ceiling is binding it affects desired reserves. A further possibility is to assign certain countries to
different regimes with probability one based on prior knowledge, something that may be
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determine whether this pattern reflects behavior of lenders, borrowers, or
both groups.
Finally, there is scope for improving these models by using data available
since the earlier studies and variables that could be constructed from
unpublished data sources. The EatonGersovitz studies use the World
Bank's World Debt Thbles series on debt to private creditors. It is important
to add short-term debt guaranteed by the debtor country to the World Bank
figures to produce a dependent variable that is more comprehensive. Cline
(1984, pp. 29 1-292) discusses one way this can be done. It would also be
useful to integrate debt owed by the private sector that is not guaranteed by
the debtor's government. This leads to questions of model specification as
well as of data because such debt is subject to sovereign risk in rather special
ways, as well as subject to conventional risks of corporate failure. At the
same time, a significant part of debt owed to private creditors is guaranteed
by the governments of these creditors, and these debts must be treated more
like debt to public creditors.
Bank loans to sovereign borrowers typically specify an interest rate that is
the sum of two components, a reference rate from an OECD financial market,
usually the London Inter Bank Offer Rate, and a spread. The reference rate
component is adjusted at fixed intervals to its current market value, so that
the loans are at floating rates. The spread is set for the duration of the loan,
and is the component specific to the loan.
There are several econometric investigations of these spreads. McDonald
(1982) provides references and some description of individual studies. These
studies focus on an interpretation of the spread as a risk premium, and
attempt to infer the lenders' perception of loss from the size of the spread.
The type of loan problem leading to the spread is not, however, explicitly
specified, nor could it be, given the methodology and information. Insofar as
a probability of loss is inferred, it seems to correspond to a probability (it) of
total loss of present value, via the condition (1it)(1+r+s)=(1+r) where r
is the safe, base rate and s is the spread.
In fact, however, the spreads may reflect other factors. There may be
higher costs of originating loans in certain countries. Tax treatment of
interest income earned by foreigners in the borrowing countries may have
implications for spreads. For instance, in Mexico, the Mexican withholding
tax may be paid by the borrower but still generates U.S. tax credits for the
lender. Other components of the loan contract, such as the front-end fees,
affect the total return to the lender.
In general, these studies use an eclectic list of explanatory variables that
are not derived from a clearly stated model of sovereign lending and
borrowing. Because they share this characteristic with models of debt
problems, we postpone a discussion of individual variables.
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other conditions of the loan agreement as explanatory variables, and these
are most probably endogenous. The motivation for their inclusion is that
these factors are known to be related to interest rates even in markets
without a riskof repayment. For instance, thereisa term structure
relationship between rate and maturity on U.S. government bonds. On the
other hand, such loan characteristics can play a special role in the context of
sovereign lending. For instance, we have already noted that loans of short
maturity allow for more frequent and effective monitoring of the sovereign
debtor, the so-called short leash. On the other hand, very short-term debt is
often poorly recorded and it is often feared that debtors who anticipate debt
problems and credit constraints may surreptitiously run up their short-term
indebtedness,theproblemmodeledbyKletzer(1984).Thusthese
econometric studies have included explanatory variables that are themselves
endogenously determined by lenders and borrowers with referenceto
considerations of sovereign risk.
By far the largest number of econometric studies of sovereign lending
attempt to explain instances of so-called problem debtors. McDonald (1982)
and Saini and Bates (1984) provide extensive surveys of variables used,
estimation methods, coefficient estimates and success in predicting the events
studied. Edwards (1984) and McFadden et al. (1985) are recent studies in this
tradition.
All these investigations try to understand the determinants shifting a
country from being a good to a bad borrower. The fundamental difficulty
with these models is defining appropriately the dependent variable, the
occurrence of a debt problem. The earliest study, Frank and Cline (1971),
asked when multilateral reschedulings of debt owed to official creditors occur
in Paris-Club type arrangements. This type of question is well posed, and has
some obvious policy interest. But it is not the question that seems central to
the current debate over sovereign lending; namely, will banks regret having
made loans to developing countries? None of the observable events (arrears,
reschedulings, or IMF programs) that these econometric studies analyze
answer this question. Within the group of countries experiencing each of
these events are presumably good credit risks and bad. It is just not possible
to say based on an event analysis what the prospects for ultimately realizing
the present value of loans are. Even in the case of an explicit repudiation, the
rupture between debtors and creditors is never irrevocable. Furthermore,
even in very bad situations from the banks' viewpoint, there may be reason
for the banks to avoid calling a default and for the country to demur from
an explicit repudiation. Such actions may trigger intervention by bank
regulators that is unwelcome to creditors, and consequently to debtors. Debt
problems are therefore hard to define. We have come full circle to our
opening comments about the difficulties of ascertaining loan status inherent
insituationsin which the relationship between debtors and creditors
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As an alternative to the study of such events as arrears, reschedulings or
IMF problems with their hazy implications for market participants, it is
probably better to focus on flows of funds between creditors and debtors. In
other words, the critical question is: When will a country with certain
characteristics owing a certain amount of debt under certain contractual
arrangements pay or receive funds from creditors with certain characteristics?
One could then, in principle, make an estimate of the present value that
creditors will realize on their original loan, as well as whether countries can
expect to receive more funds. This strategy means a return to the estimation
of debt supply and demand equations,asinEaton and Gersovitz
(1980, 1981a) but with potentially more regimes. McFadden et al. (1985)
introduce a multi-regime model of sovereign debt, but it focuses on arrears
and reschedulings, and therefore analyzes events rather than the flow of
funds.
Another shortcoming of these econometric models is their incorporation of
many variables on a rather ad hoc basis [see Eaton and Gersovitz (1981b)
for a further discussion]. For instance, some studies have used the ratio of
capital inflow to debt service, a variable that is likely to be simultaneous
with default. Others use variables like the inflation rate with little obvious
theoretical justification. If the notion is that a government short of revenue
will resort to the inflation tax as well as run arrears, then the variables are
endogenous.
While econometric analysis of international lending faces severe difficulties,
there are other types of empirical approaches that have been tried in an
attempt to forecast the prospects of debtors and creditors. Kaletsky (1985)
reviews the prospects for sanctions of various types and their costs to
debtors. This type of analysis is potentially prescriptive; it provides the type
of information that banks and debtors may use in making decisions. By
contrast, the econometric analysis assumes that the participants know what
they should do, and are doing it.
A second type of exercise used to determine repayment prospects is
represented by Cline's (1984) projection of exports, imports and other
balance of payments entries. He argues that if the credit entries grow relative
to the debit entries excluding debt service, the prospects for debt service are
enhanced. This approach neglects that the magnitudes of all these variables
are jointly determined. A country may decide that its creditors will neither
extend it new funds nor be able to deploy effective sanctions. It can then
choose to increase its imports or reserves or decrease its exports relative to
the levels projected by reference to past trends and OECD variables.
6. Conclusions
The rash of debt reschedulings led to a widespread view that banks had
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loans, the relevant question is whether there was some market failure leading
to inappropriate lendingbehavior. We havealready notedthatthe
unenforceability of contracts can imply that credit is rationed, and that
lending is probably too low relative to what would be optimal if contracts
were enforceable, and that borrowers would prefer this latter situation. Now
we turn to a related set of questions; (1) Are there factors motivating bankers
to lend more than what is likely to be repaid? (2) What is the role of bank
regulation in this context? and (3) What is the interpretation of rescheduling?
These questions are inherently very difficult to answer because there is a
one-shot aspect about the debt situation. The players do not make repetitive
choices in similar situations. There is the comparative behavior of many
countries, but they all borrow from more or less the same group of banks.
Analysts can refer, therefore, to only a rather limited experience.
6.1. Potential inefficiencies in international lending
One potentially important inefficiency results when lenders cannot observe
the magnitude of outstanding loans. In this case, the lending of an additional
dollar has an externality since it increases the likelihood of default. As
Kletzer (1984) shows, this factor can increase the amount lent and the
probability of default, as well as the initial interest rate. This type of problem
may be more relevant to international lending than domestic lending to
individual firms. In sovereign lending, seniority clauses are less important,
and a number of lenders make loans to a multitude of government ministries,
agencies and public enterprises.
There is another informational externality of potential importance: The
fact that one lender is willing to lend funds conveys information about the
creditworthiness of the borrower. Similarly, the refusal of a bank to lend
funds conveys information to other suppliers of capital. This externality may
contribute to the occurrence of runs. In our earlier discussion, we noted that
one might view a lending crisis as a run. Each creditor wishes to protect
himself; in doing so, he may actually increase the likelihood that others will
be unable to recoup what they have lent.
It is not only that the forced liquidation of assets consequent upon an
unexpected withdrawal of credit has a deleterious effect on the net worth of
the borrower. The withdrawal of credit by some creditors induces a revision
in others' estimates of the likelihood of a default, and this by itself can lead
to a run.
Lenders must make inferences about the likelihood of a default on the
basis of partial information. Some of the risks facing one borrower are
similar to those facing another borrower. Withdrawal of credit against one
borrower may even cause a re-evaluation of credit extended to other
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extending across borrowers as well as across lenders. But in general, our
conclusion is that if a runs externality were the sole cause of debt problems,
it can be handled by a lender-initiated moratorium since new funds net of
interest payments do not seem to be required.
Banks are limited liability institutions. Thus, when a bank undertakes a
risk, it may be imposing some costs on its creditors which it does not fully
take into account, just as firms or countries to which it lent money did not
fully take into account the costs that their actions had on the bank.
Many governments of developed countries insure deposits by their citizens
in the banks that lend to developing countries. This insurance obviates the
need for depositors to supervise bank portfolios, a presumably costly activity
for small depositors that provides the rationale for the insurance. In addition,
there may be a role for insurance in removing the incentive for bank panics,
as discussed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
To ensure that this insurance does not lead to moral hazard on the part of
banks, various regulations have been adopted to circumscribe their behavior.
In the United States, loans to individual borrowers are not to exceed a
fraction of bank capital, but all loans to a single country or even to all
agencies of a single government were never classifiedas being to an
individual borrower, in this sense. This provision has therefore not prevented
the aggregate of loans to entities in individual developing countries from
becoming a significant fraction of bank capital.
One important policy that regulators can take is to force banks to increase
their net worth. This is particularly important in a situation of involuntary
lending (rescheduled loans that otherwise would be in default). Banks are
induced to make these loans because they can pay dividends based on
interest income that is only paid to them because they extend new loans.
Unless these regulators prevent banks from paying these dividends, their
loans to developing countries will continuously rise relative to their capital.
This process will increase the contingent claim on the insurance schemes,
potentially without bound. In fact U.S. regulators have required two major
banks to increase their capital. There is really very little cost to extending
this program since it requires no judgment on the ultimate worth of the
loans.
A related policy that regulators should adopt is to require full disclosure of
loans made to individual countries. Increased reporting requirements have
been promulgated by U.S. regulators. This information can help uninsured
depositors and shareholders to monitor the portfolio decisions of bank
managements and thereby to deter moral hazard.
Insurance agencies can also deter the undesirable risk-taking consequences
of insurance by adopting differentiated premia that increase with the
riskiness of loans and with their proportion in an individual bank's portfolio.
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banks from undertaking correlated loans that yield expected returns net of
insurance payments below those on a safe loan, but expected profits to the
banks above those on a safe loan. Similarly, the categorization of loans as
requiring loss reserves can also be further differentiated.
The moral hazard problems caused by deposit insurance are reinforced by
typical (implicit) managerial compensation schemes in which judgments
concerning performance are based on relative performance. This too may
lead to excessive correlation of risks undertaken across banks. Assume most
banks are undertaking higher yielding loans to LDC's. If all loans go into
default, then it is unlikely that all (or possibly any) bank managers will be
punished; each manager's judgment is confirmed by the actions of the others.
On the other hand, if any one refuses to lend, and there is no default, the
lower return earned by the bank will count against the manager. Thus, as
emphasized elsewhere in the New Theory of the Firm, one must take into
account the incentives of the managers; risks faced by the firm and risks
faced by the manager are not necessarily the same. It may be possible to
deter moral hazard if regulators directly penalize managers, as happened to
some extent in the ContinentalIllinois case.
6.2. Interpreting the reschedulings
In terms of the models discussed so far, rescheduling has a number of
interpretations. One is simply that it is a device to extend the term of the
loans in question; rescheduling a short-term loan is simply another means of
issuing a long-term loan.
As we have noted, the option for certain types of unspecified interventions
that a short-term loan contract allows provides it with certain advantages
over long-term contracts. In particular, rescheduling a short-term loan gives
creditors more control over the borrower's indebtedness. That is why short-
term loans, may be employed, even when it is correctly anticipated that there
will be a high probability of a rescheduling.12
Still other explanations are that rescheduling is an action by creditors to
bring a solvent, willing-to-pay debtor through a liquidity crisis or that it is
an attempt by an insolvent or unwilling-to-pay borrower to postpone the
inevitable sanctions it will suffer when repayment ultimately is not made.
Creditors go along in the latter instance because they hope: (1) that the
problem is really one of liquidity; (2) that, by waiting, they may find other,
'2Several recent papers have attempted to model this idea formally. See, in particular, Kletzer
(1984) and Sachs and Cohen (1985) who provide models in which rescheduling agreements
prohibit the borrower from tapping sources of credit other than the initial lenders. The
likelihood of the ultimate repayment of the initial loan amount is consequently enhanced. What
is not clear in the analysis is why a long-term loan agreement could not attain the same
objective by prohibiting the borrower from borrowing from other sources during the term of the
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more gullible lenders or a public institution to assume the debt; or (3) that
the moment of public realization of the worthlessness of the loan can be
postponed until the bank personnel responsible for it have left. Heliwig's
(1977) model suggests another rationale, that rescheduling is the lender's
throwing of good money after bad to keep alive some prospect of the
debtor's repaying.
In most cases, rescheduling reflects a failure to contract completely against
all possible contingencies.'3 Ozler (1984) has developed a model analyzing
the consequences of this when, after the initial loan, the two parties confront
each other as bilateral monopolists (even though initially the loan market is
competitive). From the perspective of the initial period two magnitudes are
in doubt, the borrower's income in the second period and the penalty of
default. The borrower is ultimately solvent, however. The initial loan is
extended for one period. Three outcomes are possible. First, the borrower's
income and the default penalty both exceed the repayment obligation; the
loan is repaid on schedule. Second, the borrower's income falls short of the
repayment obligations. A liquidity problem forces the borrower to reschedule
at terms more favorable to the lenders than the initial loan, since lenders are
now monopolists vis-â-vis the borrower. Third, the penalty of default falls
below the borrower's debt service obligation. The borrower uses the threat of
nonpayment to negotiate a rescheduling of the loan on terms more favorable
to himself.
Two features of the model may have particular relevance to actual lending
in international capital markets. First, even though default never actually
occurs, borrowers can use the threat of default to extract better loan terms.
Kraft's (1984) description of Mexico's debt rescheduling indicatesthat
Mexican negotiators raised the specter of default for exactly this purpose.
Second, reschedulings may take place for different reasons, with different
implicationsforborrowers andlenders.Ozierstudiestheeffectof
rescheduling announcements on the value of the equity of banks involved.
She finds that during the late 1970's reschedulings typically raised equity,
suggesting a liquidity explanation. The opposite is the case for the early
1980's, which she interprets as reflecting a decline in the perceived cost of
default to the debtor. This view also seems consistent with the pattern of
interest-rate spreads on rescheduled loans, which were first higher and then
lower than those on so-called voluntary loans.
6.3. Final remarks
The central role played by the enforcement problem and the absence of
'3With complete contracting, repayments would be a function of the state, just as they are
with incomplete contracting, but the dependence would be specified ex ante. The following
discussion notes some of the differences that arise in the nature of the relationship between
debtors and creditors with incomplete contracting.422 J.Eaton et al., The pure theory of country risk
collateral make the international loan market fundamentally different from
domestic credit markets. In a sense, our analysis leads to a view that it is
perhaps more surprising that there has been as much lending to developing
countries than that there is not more. It is hard to interpret events to ascertain
the future course of payments by debtors to creditors and by creditors to
debtors. But we believe that our framework can help to organize thinking
about the topics raised by sovereign lending and country risk, and to point
up inconsistencies that could otherwise plague analysis in this area.
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COMMENTS
'The Pure Theory of Country Risk'
by J. Eaton, M. Gersovitz and J. Stiglitz
R. GUESNERIE
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 75006 Paris, France
Commenting on a long and impressive survey is not a straightforward task
and one may hesitate between different solutions. The first one would consist
in focusing attention on some selected models of the paper. Actually, a
number of articles described in the survey would justify detailed reflections.
The second option, somewhat utopian however, is to summarize the ideas
contained in the paper in a way which gives justice to the broad coverage of
the subject which is provided by the authors. I will take here a somewhat
intermediate path, since the subject I consider is neither very specific nor
very broad; but it is, I hope, transverse to the topics of the survey. Precisely,
my discussion concentrates on the adequacy of the general theory of
contracts to the actual understanding of contracts in the field of international
credit.
First, the relevance of some of the standard concepts of contract theory for
the economics of internationalcreditwill be assessed(A). The non-
commitment hypothesis - which is standard in the theory of international
credit contracts - will be compared to the commitment hypothesis and the
specific difficulties of the former will be evoked (B). Finally it will be argued
that some unsolved questions of the economics of international debt raise
more general challenges to the general theory of contracts (C).
(A)Modern contract theory emphasizes that contracts in general, credit
arrangements in particular, should be designed to alleviate both moral
hazard and adverse selection problems.
In the survey by EatonGersovitzStiglitz the moral hazard problem is
often evoked but there are apparently few formal models supporting the
unformal argument which is made. This is not surprising. Many models of
moral hazard, even if they are formulated in a general principalagentR. Guesnerie, Comments on the Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz paper 425
framework, reflect the situations from which they are most often inspired, i.e.,
situations in which the agent is a firm. This specific inspiration may be very
explicit; for example, the study of incidence of moral hazard on the financial
structures (debtequity ratio) of the firm, has no clear counterpart for the
understanding of international debt. I wonder how frequent is the fact that
the agent of the 'general' theory has, implicitly to be interpreted as a firm. In
any case an assessment of the specific aspects of moral hazard in inter-
national credit contract would be welcome.
My next and more substantive comment concerns adverse selection; I
argue that it is likely to be a less sensitive issue for the understanding of the
specific aspects of international credit than it is for standard credit contract.
Adverse selection obtains when the borrower has more information on the
project (or set of projects) which has to be financed than the lender has.
There is little doubt that, for example, a firm, when compared to its banker,
has superior ability in assessing the riskiness of the investment it undertakes.
However, when debtors are countries, the asymmetry of information is more
debatable. Is it clear that a government - say a South American government
- has better information on the returns of a set of projects than the bankers
- say the foreign bankers - financing the projects? The question is particular-
ly relevant for those projects the evaluation of which is made under the
supervision of international bodies. These bodies generally rely on a strong
group of experts; they have developed their own methodology of project
evaluation and have direct connections with lenders. They are able to
provide reliable assessments either on the returns of specific projects or on
the general economic situation of a country. The question then arises
whether adverse selection is crucial for the modelling of the conditions of
international credit. More exactly, I wonder to which extent the specific
explanations to credit rationing drawn from adverse selection models 'a la
StiglitzWeiss' are valid for international debt.
(B)Another specific and more central aspect of international credit con-
tracts, when compared to standard credit contracts, originates in the legal
situation of the lender. In international credit, the lender is a country
exerting sovereignty within its border and not a private body subject to the
penalty of (national) law. It follows that the enforcement mechanisms for a
contract involving a country are much less powerful than the corresponding
mechanisms in the absence of sovereignty considerations. In other words, a
debtor can more easily default when he is a sovereign country than when he
is a private agent. The possibility of easier repudiation of debt is then one
issue which has to be taken seriously; it has indeed been taken seriously both
in the literature surveyed by EatonGersovitzStiglitz and in this present
conference (where it is the subject of two papers).
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hypothesis divides the general literature on contracts. Under the commitment
hypothesis, contracts are binding agreements between the two parties. There
are different possible explanations for the emergence of binding agreements.1
The existence of a third neutral party observing at low costallthe
contractual variables is a favourable factor.2 This situation is particularly
favourable when the third party is a Court. Then agreements are legally
enforceable, the breach of contract is subject to the penalty of law. Also, in
the absence of a third party, both parties may take ex ante actions which will
make very costly the breach of contract (this is what the strategy of burning
its vessels is about). Finally, in a repeated relationship, reputation will act as
a (partial) substitute for penalties to enforce the realization of the contract.
The commitment hypothesis has been more explored in contract theory
than the alternative one; however the present theory does not shed full light
on all the issues. For example, if we understand in depth the static adverse
selection problem with one dimensional one-sided asymmetry (when a
principal faces an agent having private information)3 much less is known on
the structure of optimal contracts with multidimensional information and
two-sided asymmetries; also, the optimal incorporation of the flow of new
information in an intertemporal contract to which both parties are fully
committed only starts to be understood, even in the simplest case where the
static model is fully grasped.
The commitment hypothesis implies that contracts are binding for the
duration of the relationship between the partners. At contrary, the non-
commitment hypothesis covers cases either where no commitment at all is
possible, or when only short-term commitment (short-term with respect to
the duration of the relationship) is feasible. The theory of contracts is usually
recognized as more difficult under the non-commitment hypothesis than
under the commitment hypothesis. Without going into the details of the
problem, one can note that non-commitment isassociated with truly
dynamic stories and involves a more sophisticated game theoretic structure.
Indeed the choice of adequate game theoretical equilibrium concepts raises a
number of delicate questions on the so-called 'out of equilibrium beliefs' of
the players.4
Real contractual conditions seldom exactly fall in the polar cases sketched
above. (Commitment may be limited to some variables; reputation can
partially act as a substitute.) However, the preceding analysis of the case of
international credit suggests that it stands closer to the polar case of non-
1To be binding, contracts have obviously to be detailed enough to be adapted to any
contingency.
2The neutrality of the third party being the main source of problems.
3See GuesnerieLaffont (1985) for an analysis of a general model of this type, a model which
includes as particular cases the standard adverse selection model of credit contracts.
41t has induced a technical literature originating in the work of Selten, see also KrepsWilson
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commitment than to the other and better explored case of commitment. The
considerations of sovereignty of the borrower pushed at their limits leads to
view the credit contract between the lender and the borrower as a non-
commitment arrangement. Before stressing some of the modelling problems
associated with non-commitment, let me open a parenthesis. Commitment is
always in a sense preferable to non-commitment. This is even a 'theorem'
following from the fact that the non-commitment optimal contract can (at
least) be mimicked under commitment. Why is then non-commitment so
frequent in real contracts? A number of answers can be given which I do
not want to discuss. Note, however, that the argument of beneficial commit-
ment is not irrelevant for the organization of international relationship
between nations.5
(C) How to model the international credit relationship under the polar
assumption that enforcement mechanisms are very costly or equivalently that
repudiation is a decision with no direct cost for the borrower?
The simpler option rules out uncertainty from the picture; the lender and
borrower have known utility functions; the lender proposes a contract, the
borrower can repudiate it without direct cost. Indirect costs follow first from
the exclusion of the capital market after the time of default; the exact
exclusion cost may reflect different considerations. [It depends upon the
volume of international trade in Gersovitz (1983), on the fluctuations of
unsmoothed consumption in EatonGersovitz (1981), on the restriction to
capital accumulation in Allen (1983) or CohenSachs (1985).] Also, exclusion
generates an inefficiency in the rise of the stock of capital in CohenSachs
(1985). Whatever the given set of assumptions, the contract must be taken
from the set of self enforceable contracts, i.e., from the set of contracts for
which it is in the interest of both parties to respect it. The optimal contract
naturally reflects the specific exclusion costs which are assumed. Let me now
suggest some extensions of the above basic frame and then evoke different
objections to this basic frame.
Directions of extensions are obvious but may involve significant technical
difficulties.First, the contract could be made contingent to exogenous
events,6 so that circumstances in which rescheduling occurs are agreed upon
at the outset. Second, although I previously expressed doubts on the
relevance of adverse selection arguments bearing on the efficiency of the
borrower, one might like to introduce adverse selection arguments bearing
5As argued unformally at the Conference, it is because one can go to jail in case of default
that somebody can possibly borrow the money to buy the Château de Ragny. No definitive
conclusion for the organisation of international trade should however be drawn from this
remark!
61n the literature on wage contracts, there are models in which the wage contract, supposed to
be self enforceable, is made contingent to the exogenous fluctuations of the spot wage; see
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on other of the borrower's characteristics. The complexity of the analysis,
which would then have to rely on concepts such as sequential equilibria,
perfect NashBayesian equilibria, would increase significantly.7
To finish, let me come to some difficulties with the basic frame. Rather
than attempting a more synthetical assessment of these difficulties, let us
approach them through a sample of two questions. First question: Why is it
the case that after default the country is assumed to be excluded for ever
from the credit market? Second question. Often the self enforceable contract
will be such that at several times the borrower is almost indifferent between
defaulting and continuing the relationship. At these times the loss caused by
default to the lender may be very high. Why is it not the case that the lender
cannot take advantage of his bargaining power at such times?
I understand that one can give answers to each of these questions. I only
wonder whether coherent answers are actually given. In other words, I am
asking myself whether the assumptions on competition and cooperation
(number of lenders and borrowers, nature and degree of cooperation between
them) which are needed to justify each one of the above mentioned features
are both compatible between them and coherent with the assumed form of
the contract. In still other words, I found it difficult to understand in some of
the models of international credit contract surveyed here the precise nature
of competition which is assumed. This may reflect my limited knowledge of
the models under consideration. This may also not be so surprising since the
theory has not built at the present stage a satisfactory theory of competition
when complex contracts are involved. The questions raised by the economics
of international debt could hence be relevant and challenging for the general
theory of contracts.
7For an example of the analysis of an optimal contract under adverse selection and non-
commitment, see FreixasGuesnerieTirole (1985).
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COMMENTS
'The Pure Theory of Country Risk'
by J. Eaton, M. Gersovitz and J. Stiglitz
Martin HELLWIG
University of Bonn, 53 Bonn, FRG
I agree with the authors that the problems of international borrowing and
lending must be analysedin terms of strategic behaviour rather than
mechanical concepts of 'insolvency' or 'illiquidity'. In this comment, I shall
briefly try to give my own perspective on some of the underlying issues.
1. Debt contracts and the allocation of risks
First I want to pose the question why most international finance is based
on the instrument of the debt contract. In its traditional form, the debt
contract imposes a fixed repayment obligation on the borrower. He must
meet this obligation or else default and incur a set of more or less severe
sanctions.
In an uncertain world, this type of contract usually involves an inefficient
allocation of risks. Efficiency would require that financiers and borrowers
share all risks in proportion to their respective degrees of risk tolerance.
Unless a borrower is risk neutral, at least some risk should be born by his
financiers.
However, the debt contract provides for hardly any risk sharing at all and
imposes most risks on the borrower. Unless the borrower defaults, the
financier gets his fixed repayment and bears none of the risks surrounding
the borrower's financial situation. This one-sided imposition of risks upon
the borrower is exacerbated by the more recent form of debt contracts which
specify the borrower's repayment obligation with reference to the London
interbank offered rate (LIBOR). In addition to the risks surrounding his own
financial situation, the borrower now also bears the risks involving the
financier's opportunity cost of funds as measured by LIBOR. Since I do not
believe that borrowers are risk neutral, I find this one-sided imposition of
risks hard to explain.
The absence of risk sharing is usually explained by considerations of moral
hazard or other types of information asymmetry. For example, Douglas Gale
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obligation actually is the optimal incentive compatible contract for a private
firm and a risk neutral (!) lender, if (a) only the firm's returns are risky, and
(b) except in the event of bankruptcy, the lender cannot directly observe the
realizations of the firm's random returns [Gale and Hellwig (1985)]. Under
this information asymmetry, the firm's payment to the creditor must be
independent of its return realization - at least outside the event of bankrupt-
cy - because the firm can always 'lie' and report that return realization which
minimizes its repayment obligation to the lender. Similarly, debt finance may
be desirable if the firm's returns depend on, e.g., the manager's effort and if
the level of effort cannot be observed by the financiers [see, e.g., Jensen and
Meckling (1976)].
Considerations of this type also apply in the case of lending to countries
rather then firms. Many of the factors determining a country's financial and
economic situation are country specific and cannot be observed by outside
financiers. Therefore, the underlying potential for sharing the risks surround-
ing these factors cannot be exploited. Any attempt to share these risks would
provide the borrowing country with incentives to reduce its payments to its
financiers either by reducing its own economic effort or by simply misreport-
ing its actual financial and economic situation. In contrast, the debt contract
is much less vulnerable to moral hazard. As long as default is not an issue,
the financier does not get involved in the borrower's affairs at all. The fixed
interest obligation does not depend on the borrower's activities. Whatever
incentive problems arise must, therefore, be limited to the case of default.
However, the preceding argument applies only to risks that involve an
information asymmetry between the borrower and the financier. The moral
hazard argument does not apply to risks whose incidence is unaffected by
either party's actions and which can be observed by both parties alike. In
particular, the moral hazard argument does not apply to risks arising (i)
from fluctuations in the exchange rate of the dollar, and (ii) from fluctuations
in international interest rates, such as LIBOR. Both, the dollar exchange rate
and the London interbank offered rate are universally observable and are
hardly affected by the actions of any particular borrower or lender in the
market. Therefore, it should be possible to share the risks arising from these
variables efficiently between international borrowers and lenders. To the
extent that the lenders seem to be better qualified to bear these risks, such
efficient risk sharing would have left most of the exchange and interest rate
risk with the lenders rather than the borrowers. The debt contracts that have
been concluded have done the opposite and have imposed practically all
exchange and interest rate risks on the borrowers rather than the lenders.
From this perspective, the international debt crisis of recent years seems to
be the êonsequence of (i) an inefficient prior allocation of exchange and
interest raterisks in international borrowing and lending, and (ii)an
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combination of high dollar exchange rates and high interest rates in recent
years entails an exceptionally high real value for the borrowing countries'
contractual repayment obligations to the lenders. Under an ex ante efficient
risk sharing agreement, at least some of the consequences of the high dollar
exchange rates and the high interest rates would have been borne by the
lenders.
At this point, one is tempted to follow Grossman and Van Huyck (1985)
and to regard the current reschedulings as a substitute for the risk sharing
arrangements that were absent from the original contracts. However, the
reschedulings do not seem to distinguish between the incidence of exchange
and interest risks that are immune from moral hazard and the incidence of
other risksthat are subject to moral hazard. In ordertoassessthe
reschedulings, we must, therefore, take a closer look at the strategic issues
connected with default and, in particular, with default on country debt.
2. Sovereign debt and the problem of default
To the extent that the borrower may default on his obligation, the debt
contract is vulnerable to moral hazard just like any other contract. Default
may occur because the debtor is unwilling to pay or because he is unable to
pay. Even if he is unable to pay, this inability may be due to his own careless
behaviour as well as to circumstances butside his control.
In the given context of lending to countries, Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz
stress the problems arising from a debtor's unwillingness to pay. I have no
quarrel with their analysis of these problems, butIbelieve that they
underrate the role played by the debtor countries' inability to pay.
As Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz note, a government's ability to pay its
debts to its foreign creditors depends on (a) its ability to raise funds through
taxation, and (b) its ability to transfer there funds abroad. On both accounts
I believe that a government's objective ability to pay is significantly less than
Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz suggest.
First, any assessment of a government's ability to raise revenues through
taxation must take account of social and political constraints as well as the
deadweight cost of taxation. Taxation will be considered excessive and will
lead to an overthrow of the government long before tax receipts reach the
EatonGersovitzStiglitz measure of national net worth minus deadweight
costs. If we look at eighteenth century France, the mere observation of 'the
poor state in the rich country' [Gaxotte (1928)] might suggest that, in the
words of Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz, the government was not 'anywhere
near making the maximum feasible debt service'. Yet in the 1780's, the
government's attempt to avoid a debt crisis by increasing taxes played a
major role in the developments leading to the French Revolution.
Secondly,Ibelieve that Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz underrate the432 M. Heliwig, Comments on the Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz paper
traditional transfer problem. I do not see why the effect of the transfer upon
the terms of trade should be negligible (in relation to the transfer itself) if the
paying country is small relative to the receiving country. The terms of trade
effect should depend on the difference between the paying and the receiving
countries' marginal propensities to consume different goods. Unless these
marginal propensities are taken to differ according to a country's size, I do
not see why relative size should matter. Moreover, any adverse terms of
trade effect that does occur can be quite large if demand for the debtor
country's export goods is sufficiently price-inelastic.
In summary, we cannot dismiss the possibility that the current inter-
national debt crisis is due to the debtor countries' objective inability to pay.
However, by the very nature of the underlying incentive problems, the
creditors and the international monetary and financial institutions will find it
impossible to determine whether a given default is due to unwillingness or
inability to pay. Any debtor who is merely unwilling to pay will claim that
he is actually unable to pay, e.g., that any tightening of fiscal poling would
risk a social revolution. The validity of such a claim can hardly be assessed
from the outside. The reparations that were owed by Weimar Germany after
the Treaty of Versailles provide a good example: Even now, the historians
finditdifficult to decide whether 'the Germany could have paid (the)
reparations...if they had loyally tried to' [Kindleberger (1984, p. 306)].
In the context of sovereign debt, this information asymmetry is signifi-
cantly more serious than for private debt. In our analysis of private
borrowing and lending with asymmetric information, Douglas Gale and I
assume (i) that a default imposes real costs on the debtor, e.g., because of
non-monetary sanctions, and (ii) that in the event of a default, a receiver is
put in to observe the debtor's true ability to pay and to force him to pay.
Under these assumptions, the borrower never wants to default on his
repayment obligation if he can avoid it.
In the case of sovereign debt, such disciplining devices are much less
effective. By today's legal standards, the imposition of a receivership on a
country represents an intolerable violation of national sovereignty. Moreover,
it is of some interest to note that such receiverships have been unsuccessful
even where they were tried in the past. In the case of Weimar Germany, the
Reparation Agent-General under the Dawes Plan performed some of the
functions of a receiver. This Reparation Agent-General himself felt that he
had so little impact on German fiscal policy that he did not want to take
any responsibility, and in 1928 he himself took the initiative to restore the
German government's fiscal autonomy [Fischer (1968, p. 36)].
Respect for national sovereignty also limits the sanctions on default by a
country. A country that defaults on its debts need not fear any analogue of
the criminal proceedings to which a private debtor may be subjected. Eaton,
Gersovitz and Stiglitz rightly observe that an inability to obtain loans in the
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Even this sanction may be quite ineffective. For consider the decision of a
debtor who must choose whether to honour a repayment obligation x >0 or
to default and thereby lose all access to future borrowing. Presumably this
debtor will default unless the present value to him of having access to the
market in the future is at least x. The present value to him of having access
to the market in the future is not given by the size of future loans - which
will have to be repaid - but by the size of the surpluses on future loans after
deducting future repayments. For the repayment x to be worthwhile, the
present value of the sum of surpluses on future loan contracts must exceed x.
Assuming that discount rates are non-negligible, I expect that this condition
can only be met if the debtor anticipates substantial growth so that future
surpluses are quite large.
From this perspective, the international debt crisis of recent years may be
seen as a consequence of reduced growth expectations in international capital
markets and in the world economy. The downward revision of growth
estimates in the recession of the 1980s reduced the present value of the
debtor countries' future access to international capital markets. The one
sanction that creditors have thereby lost some of its bite. Therefore the
debtor countries began to feel that default might be preferable and asserted
that they were unable to fulfil their obligations. By the very nature of the
information asymmetry, this moral hazard interpretation of the debt crisis is
empirically indistinguishable from an inability-to-pay explanation based on
the movements in exchange and interest rates.
3. Rescheduling and the problem of time inconsistency
So far I have assumed that the threat of sanctions on default is credible.
However, this is not generally the case. Once we look at repeated credit
relations, we realize that the creditor's behaviour is subject to a fundamental
time consistency: Ex ante, when the contract is concluded, he wishes to
threaten the most severe sanctions in order to provide the debtor with an
incentive to manage his affairs as carefully as he can and to default on his
obligation only if he is truly unable to pay. However, ex post, after the
debtor has defaulted, the creditor usually does not want to carry out his
threat. If he forces the debtor into immediate bankruptcy, he may as well
write his claims off. On the other hand, if he extends a further loan, success
on whatever project the debtor pursues next will ensure the profitability of
previous loans as well as the next loan.
The current renegotiations and reschedulings provide ample evidence of
this time inconsistency. In fact, the lenders who do not wish to write off their
country loans seem to be more eager to avoid an open default than the
borrowers. In fear for their balance sheets, they 'reschedule' payments in
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In the ex post situation when a debtor claims that he cannot pay,
rescheduling may actually be the best alternative given that an open default
would entail considerable private risks for some of the lender banks as well
as social risks for the international financial and monetary system.
However, we must realize that from the ex ante point of view these
renegotiations impose considerable costs on future loans. In the future any
borrowing country will know that the sanctions on default are small and will
behave accordingly. For the currently outstanding loans, the incentive effects
of sanctions may be irrelevant because they concern only bygones. For future
loans, these incentive effects are anything but irrelevant. If a lack of credible
sanctions induces a high risk of negligent or fraudulent default, then the
volume of borrowing and lending is likely to be substantially reduced.
This 'breakdown of lending', as Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz call it, was
the main subject of my earlier paper [Hellwig (1977)]. The problem can be
avoided if the creditor takes account of reputation effects whereby the
renegotiation of an outstanding loan has a negative impact on the anticip-
ations and behaviours of other borrowers. However, such reputation effects
are implausible if no two borrowers are alike so that there is no inherent
reason why the lender's treatment of current borrowers should give any
indication of his likely treatment of future borrowers. In the case of lending
to countries, this problem is particularly bothersome since, of course, Poland
is different from Iran, which in turn is different from Mexico, which in turn
is different from.
As far as I can see, the only way to avoid the problems caused by time
inconsistency is for the creditor to obtain some direct control over the
debtor's net cash flows. If there is no such control and if the debtor
anticipates that the creditor will not give him up, then the debtor is never
forced to be careful about how he manages his resources.
To see the point, consider the. example of New York City. In the early
seventies, the New York City banks founditnecessary to repeatedly
renegotiate their loans to the city. Whatever promises of fiscal discipline
accompanied these renegotiations were not kept, and the banks had to
provide additional loans at an ever increasing rate. The problem was that
New York City's cash flows were under the effective control of the unions
who did not see the need for fiscal discipline because the banks were always
willing to renegotiate and to provide more money. The situation only
changed when the Municipal Assistance Corporation took over and imposed
fiscal discipline through its control of New York City's finances.
The question is whether something like this can be achieved by, e.g., the
International Monetary Fund's imposition of austerity measures during loan
renegotiations. In this context it is important that whatever agency imposes
fiscal discipline should not appear as a receiver who merely liquidates past
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provide the debtors with a positive incentive for cooperation by providing a
promise of additional loans- and hence of some hope for the future - which
will be mutually beneficial if the required discipline is kept. However, the
arguments of the preceding section suggest that in a climate of pessimism
about the world economy the scope for such promises is rather narrow.
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